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Abstract Previous findings have suggested that number pro-
cessing involves a mental representation of numerical magni-
tude. Other research has shown that sensory experiences are
part and parcel of the mental representation (or “simulation”)
that individuals construct during reading. We aimed at explor-
ing whether arithmetic word-problem solving entails the con-
struction of a mental simulation based on a representation of
numerical magnitude. Participants were required to solve
word problems and to perform an intermediate figure discrim-
ination task that matched or mismatched, in terms of magni-
tude comparison, the mental representations that individuals
constructed during problem solving. Our results showed that
participants were faster in the discrimination task and per-
formed better in the solving task when the figures matched
the mental representations. These findings provide evidence
that an analog magnitude-based mental representation is rou-
tinely activated during word-problem solving, and they add to
a growing body of literature that emphasizes the experiential
view of language comprehension.
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Grounded cognition
Psycholinguistic theories have assumed that understanding a
text consists not just in the construction of its propositional
structure (e.g., Kintsch & van Dijk, 1978), but is only fully
understood if a reader has constructed a mental representation
or “simulation” of the situation that the text describes. This
view of understanding as mental simulation is rooted in expe-
riential theories of language comprehension, according to
which the mental representations involved in comprehen-
sion may take the form of perceptual symbols, which are
directly derived from perceptual experiences (Barsalou,
1999; Glenberg & Robertson, 1999; Zwaan, 1999). Neverthe-
less, until now, no study has directly addressed the relevance
of this view in the domain of arithmetic word-problem solv-
ing. The present study constitutes a first step to fill this gap.
Arithmetic word problems verbally describe a situation
(Verschaffel, Greer, & De Corte, 2000). Therefore, this type
of text can be considered, like any other text, as a valid
discourse entity, since not only arithmetic skills are involved
in solving these problems, but also understanding of both
the language involved and the situation denoted by its verbal
description (Kintsch, 1988). The traditional theoretical po-
sition postulates that the representation of the text of the
problem is built through the transformation of linguistic
inputs into conceptual representations of their meaning in
the form of propositional symbols—an abstract symbolic
structure (e.g., Kintsch & Greeno, 1985). In this regard,
Thevenot (2010) has recently provided evidence that the
mental representation built by individuals to solve arithme-
tic word problems preserves only the relationship between
the elements of the situation described in the wording.
However, whether the nature of this mental representation
goes beyond an abstract propositional structure remains
unknown. In this sense, the experiential view of language
comprehension is particularly suitable for accounting for the
nature of the mental representation constructed during word-
problem solving. As is proposed in this theoretical perspec-
tive, individuals understand language by constructing a per-
ceptual simulation of the objects and events described. This
mental representation is based on perceptual symbols that
J. Orrantia (*) :D. Múñez
Department of Educational and Developmental Psychology,
Universidad de Salamanca,





Mem Cogn (2013) 41:98–108
DOI 10.3758/s13421-012-0241-1
arise from analog perceptual experiences, which are activated
while words and sentences are processed. Thus, considerable
experimental support has provided evidence that readers men-
tally represent motion, orientation, or shape information dur-
ing reading (for an overview, see Zwaan, 2004), which
confirms that language comprehension strongly depends on
the reader’s experience with, and knowledge of, the world. On
the basis of this theoretical stance, we suggest that the mental
representation constructed during word-problem solving
might not be an abstract symbolic structure, but rather an
analog representation (or “simulation”) that involves a
reenactment of solvers’ experience with the processing of
magnitude information for quantities.
Thus, much like orientation or shape, numerical magni-
tude is a basic feature of the environment to which individ-
uals appear to attend (Piazza, 2010), and its representation
appears to emerge early in human development (Xu &
Spelke, 2000). This awareness of numerical magnitude is
thought to serve as a foundation on which symbolic numer-
ical thinking is built. Evidence has suggested that the devel-
opment of the ability to represent and process numerical
symbols (such as number words and Arabic numerals) is
grounded on these preexisting magnitude representations
(see Ansari, 2008, for a review). In the course of learning,
when children are first being introduced to formal arithme-
tic, mental representations of numerosity are strongly related
to physical quantity representations. Children construct ex-
ternal representations using objects or fingers to count sets,
to manipulate these sets (by combining, adding, comparing,
. . .), or to calculate. Thus, individuals can accumulate a lot
of experiences with these external representations on which
the numerical symbols are mapped, so that these experien-
ces, which are closely bound to perception and action, might
leave experiential traces that could be reactivated during
problem processing.
Although the role of magnitude information in word-
problem processing has attracted little systematic re-
search, many studies have demonstrated that number
processing involves a mental representation of numerical
magnitude. A widely replicated effect in this regard is
the “numerical distance effect” (Moyer & Landauer,
1967), which indicates that it is more time-consuming
to compare two numbers when the numerical distance
between them is small (e.g., 7 vs. 9) than when it is
large (e.g., 3 vs. 8). This effect has also been reported
in other, nonnumerical magnitude dimensions, such as
line length or geometrical shapes (for a review, see
Cohen Kadosh, Lammertyn, & Izard, 2008), indicating
that the magnitude representation of numbers is shared
with other nonnumerical magnitude dimensions (Walsh,
2003). It has also been demonstrated that numerical and
nonnumerical quantities interact with each other. In the
numerical Stroop task, participants take more time to
judge either numerical or physical size when the number
magnitude and the physical size of a digit are incongruent
(Schwarz & Ischebeck, 2003; see also Gebuis, Cohen
Kadosh, de Haan, & Henick, 2009, for a nonsymbolic
size congruity task). Thus, the incompatible magnitude of
one task-irrelevant dimension would interfere with the
judgment on the other magnitude dimension. In addition
to behavioral research, a number of neuroimaging studies
on number processing have demonstrated that the intra-
parietal sulcus (IPS) is involved in processing both numer-
ical and nonnumerical magnitudes (see Brannon, 2006,
and Cohen Kadosh et al., 2008, for reviews). Thus, IPS
activations have been observed with magnitudes presented as
symbolic stimuli (i.e., as Arabic or verbal numerals), nonsym-
bolic discrete stimuli (e.g., dot patterns), or continuous stimuli
(e.g., length of lines).
Despite the fact that most studies on quantity processing
have focused on simple tasks (e.g., magnitude comparison), it
would be expected that in higher cognitive tasks, such as
word-problem solving, a representation of numerical magni-
tude related to the situation described would also be activated.
Given that in a problem such as “John has 5 marbles more
than Mary; If John has 8 marbles, how many marbles does
Mary have?” the first sentence leads to a mental representation
that preserves the relationship between the terms, it might be
possible for experiential traces, related to the processing of
numerical magnitude, to be reactivated to produce a mental
simulation of the described situation, similar to:
This mental representation would be feasible, since
solvers likely engage in magnitude comparison to verify
which protagonist possesses more target objects, and in
addition, converging evidence has indicated that a shared
magnitude representation underlies different quantity
dimensions. In fact, Lee et al. (2007) found common
activation of the IPS associated with symbolic and non-
symbolic representations during reading of a word prob-
lem. Specifically, participants were asked to transform
information from a word problem (e.g., James has 50
fewer watches than Mike) to either a symbolic equation
(e.g., J 0 M – 50) or a nonsymbolic representation based
on a diagram made up of rectangles to represent relation-
ships in the word problem (e.g., a rectangle representing
Mike, and another, shorter one representing James). The
authors found activation in the IPS for both the symbolic
and nonsymbolic conditions, which suggests that there is
a common mechanism for magnitudes even in the con-
text of word-problem solving.
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The present study
The purpose of this study was to assess whether a magnitude-
based mental representation is routinely activated when arith-
metic word problems are solved. This representation would go
beyond a conceptual representation in the form of proposi-
tional symbols, to reflect in terms of magnitudes the situation
that the word problem describes. Participants were required to
solve “compare”word problems (see Riley, Greeno, & Heller,
1983) and to perform an intermediate discrimination task not
related to the solving process (see Fig. 1). On each trial,
participants read the first sentence of the problem, which
stated the relationship between two variables, then judged
whether two sequentially presented figures were perceptually
the same or different, and finally read the remaining informa-
tion of the problem in order to solve it. Importantly, by using a
same–different task instead of a magnitude comparison task
(i.e., to decide whether the second figure was larger or smaller
than the first), any explicit cue related to magnitude would be
eliminated. Therefore, the task would reflect the construction
of an automatic mental representation from the target sentence
(Orrantia, Rodríguez, & Vicente, 2010; Tzelgov & Ganor-
Stern, 2005), since the figures’ discrimination would not be
part of the task requirements (i.e., problem solving).
Assuming that the first rectangle would be mapped onto
the first person named in the word problem and the second
rectangle mapped onto the second person named in the
problem (see the General Discussion), the sequences of
figures would either match or mismatch the possible mental
representation constructed from the relational sentence of
the problem. In the matching condition, the figures depicted
the relationship between the variables contained in the rela-
tional sentence (John > Peter in Fig. 1), whereas in the
mismatching condition, the figures depicted the opposite
relationship (John < Peter). In keeping with this, the
identical condition (John 0 Peter) was also considered
as a mismatching condition.
In addition, the compare problems were either consistent
(CL) or inconsistent (IL) language problems (Lewis &
Mayer, 1987). In a CL problem (e.g., “John has 7 marbles
Fig. 1 Example of the three types of experimental trials in Experiment 2
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more than Peter; John: ? Peter: 8”), the unknown variable
(i.e., John) is the grammatical subject of the relational sen-
tence, and the relational term (i.e., “more than”) is consistent
with the required arithmetic operation (i.e., addition). In an
IL problem (e.g., “John has 7 marbles more than Peter;
John: 15 Peter: ?”), the unknown variable (i.e., Peter) is
the object of the relational sentence, and the relational term
(i.e., “more than”) is in conflict with the required arithmetic
operation (i.e., subtraction). A number of empirical studies
have shown that IL problems are considerably more difficult
to solve than CL problems (e.g., Hegarty, Mayer, & Monk,
1995; Verschaffel, 1994; Verschaffel, De Corte, & Pauwels,
1992), possibly because, according to Lewis and Mayer’s
(1987) “consistency hypothesis,” solvers prefer the order
included in CL problems, in which the unknown variable
is the subject of the relational sentence. Thus, when given an
IL problem, solvers are assumed to mentally rearrange the
relational sentence by reversing the subject and object as
well as the relational term. This mental rearrangement pro-
cedure is a cognitively demanding one, which will result in
greater difficulty for IL than for CL problems.
If solvers activate a magnitude-based representation, the
discrimination task on pairs of figures matching the mental
representation created from the relational sentence would be
faster than on pairs mismatching the mental representation.
Furthermore, match/mismatch effects would be obtained for
the problem-solving task. Since the relational sentence was
not displayed to participants at the time of problem solving,
the matching condition may act as an (implicitly presented)
external representation reinforcing the salience of the mental
representation created from the relational sentence. Thus,
problem solving would be faster and less error-prone in the
matching than in the mismatching conditions. Nevertheless,
this effect would be larger for IL than for CL problems,
since IL problems require additional processing to rearrange
the relational sentence. In this sense, the figures in the
matching condition could serve as a type of external mem-
ory that would reduce the demands on working memory in
this rearrangement procedure.
Four experiments were designed to examine these
predictions. The aims of Experiments 1a and 1b were to
establish a baseline in order to interpret the results of dis-
crimination and problem-solving tasks in terms of facilita-
tion and/or interference due to the matching/mismatching
condition. To do this, in Experiment 1a participants per-
formed a discrimination task on pairs of figures following
presentation of a neutral sentence—that is, one that did not
activate magnitudes. In Experiment 1b, participants solved
CL and IL compare word problems with no intermediate
discrimination task. Experiment 2 was designed to provide
evidence that an analog magnitude-based mental represen-
tation is activated while solving arithmetic word problems.
Participants were required to solve compare word problems
and to perform an intermediate figure discrimination task
that matched or mismatched, in terms of magnitude, the
mental representation of the problem (see Fig. 1). Finally,
an additional control study (Exp. 3) tested whether the
effects of facilitation/interference on problem solving were
due to the nature of the mental representation induced by the
discrimination task. For this purpose, participants solved
compare word problems in which the sequence of figures
was replaced by a sequence of colors.
Preliminary Experiments 1a and 1b
Experiment 1a
Method
Participants A group of 32 psychology undergraduates
took part in this experiment.
Materials A total of 48 experimental sentences, each fol-
lowed by a figure discrimination task and probe-word recog-
nition, were used in the experiment. All of the sentences
(which varied in length from six to eight words) mentioned
one or two differently named characters engaged in an action.
The sentences did not (explicitly or implicitly) involve any
reference to quantity. The probe word could be any word from
the sentence. Following presentation of the sentence was the
figure discrimination task. Two types of sequences of figures
were presented: nonidentical and identical. As figures, we
used ten monochromatic gray rectangles that were 820 pixels
wide. The heights of the different rectangles increased by
intervals of 100 pixels, ranging from 480 to 1,480 pixels. To
avoid differences in visual scanning speed, the figures’ lower
edges were set on screen at the same level (y 0 –150), and
nonidentical pairs differed by 300 pixels in height, which was
enough to discriminate the two figures as nonidentical. Each
sequence consisted of one pair of figures selected from 22
possible pairings (10 identical and 12 nonidentical, which
excluded the two pairs in which the smallest and largest
figures were presented first in the order). This pairing proce-
dure aimed at preventing participants from anticipating the
size of the second figure from the size of the first one. After the
discrimination task, the probe word appeared. The trials were
grouped into an initial warm-up block of five trials, followed
by one experimental block of 48 trials. The experimental
block contained equal numbers of identical and nonidentical
sequences and probe-present and probe-absent trials.
Procedure The stimuli were presented using SuperLab soft-
ware, which ran on computers with 15-in. monitors (this
same apparatus was used in all experiments). On each trial,
the sentence (Geneva 36-point font) was presented in the
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middle of the screen. Pressing the space bar caused the
sentence to be erased and the discrimination task to be
presented. Following a blank screen (100 ms) and a fixation
cross (150 ms), a sequence of two monochromatic gray
rectangles was shown. The first rectangle was shown for
600 ms in the middle of the screen. After another blank
screen (100 ms) and fixation cross (150 ms), the second
rectangle was presented in the same place as the first one.
Participants indicated via keypresses whether the two fig-
ures were the same or different (the response-key assign-
ment was counterbalanced between subjects). Then, a single
probe word appeared in the middle of the screen. Partici-
pants were required to indicate as quickly as possible wheth-
er the probe word had occurred in the preceding sentence by
pressing the key that was also assigned to a SAME response
in the figure discrimination task, if it had, and the key that
was assigned to a DIFFERENT response, if it had not. After
an information screen (“press the space bar to continue”)
and a blank screen (2, 500 ms), the next trial started.
Results
Response times that were 2.5 standard deviations from the
mean or those following incorrect responses in the discrim-
ination task were discarded. This eliminated no more than
2 % of the data. No significant differences were found
between the responses to identical and nonidentical figures
(597 and 608 ms, respectively; p > .15).
Experiment 1b
Method
Participants A group of 25 psychology undergraduates
participated in this experiment.
Materials The participants were presented with 48 experi-
mental arithmetic word problems. The problems belonged to
the Compare 3 to Compare 6 categories (described below)
according to the classification scheme of Riley et al. (1983),
and they differed in their situations, the names of the pro-
tagonists, and the nature of the objects. Whereas in Compare
3 (including the term “more than”) and Compare 4 (includ-
ing the term “less than”) the unknown variable is the gram-
matical subject of the relational sentence, in Compare 5
(including the term “more than”) and Compare 6 (including
the term “less than”), the unknown variable is the object of
the relational sentence. Therefore, Compare 3 and 4 corre-
spond to CL problems, and Compare 5 and 6 to IL problems.
The first sentence of each problem was the relational sentence
(e.g., “John has 7 marbles more than Peter”). After presenta-
tion of the relational sentence, the remaining information of
the problem appeared in a line that involved the characters and
the data (e.g., “John: 15 Peter: ?”; see Fig. 1). We used this
format because in a standard format (e.g., “if John has 8 mar-
bles, how many marbles does Peter have?”) the self-
presentation time for the question contains the resolution time
in addition to the reading time; the question could even be
inferred, so that its reading time would be much faster. All of
this would result in a distortion of the response times. In order
to reduce additional delay between the relational sentence and
the answer, the order of presentation of the characters in this
segment of the problem was the same as in the relational
sentence. Since the unknown variable could be the grammat-
ical subject or object of the relational sentence, half of the
problems were CL, and the other half IL problems.
The operands used in the word problems consisted of
pairs of numbers selected from 36 possible pairings of the
digits 2 through 9 when operand order was ignored. Ties
(e.g., 3 + 3) and nontie pairs with a sum or minuend of 11
were excluded. To control the problem size effect,1 operand
pairs with a sum or minuend ≤10 were classified as small,
whereas operand pairs with a sum or minuend ≥12 were
classified as large. Thus, half of the word problems
contained operands classified as small, and the other half
had operands classified as large. Twenty-four filler word
problems were included to vary the form of the problems.
These filler word problems belonged to the Combine 2
category of Riley et al.’s (1983) classification scheme
(e.g., “Joe and Tom have 8 marbles altogether; Joe: 3
Tom: ?”).
Procedure On each trial, the relational sentence (Geneva
36-point font) was presented in the middle of the screen.
Pressing the space bar caused the relational sentence to be
erased and the remaining information of the problem to
appear in the middle of the screen. The participants were
told to solve the word problem correctly as quickly as
possible. A microphone connected to a voice-activated relay
and interfaced with the computer registered the latency of
the responses. After an information screen (“press the space
bar to continue”) and a blank screen (2,500 ms), the next
trial started. To familiarize participants with the procedure,
they performed four practice trials.
Scoring For each participant, two scores were determined
for each experimental word problem: (a) the proportion of
operation errors—that is, reversal of the numerical operation
of the problem (i.e., addition for subtraction or subtraction
for addition)—and (b) the response time between the end of
1 One of the most extensively researched phenomena of cognitive
arithmetic is the problem size effect, which refers to the observation
that the difficulty of simple arithmetic combinations generally
increases with numerical size, and that problems with larger operands
(e.g., 7 + 8) are solved more slowly than those with smaller operands
(e.g., 3 + 2; see Ashcraft, 1992, for a review).
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reading of the relational sentence and the moment that the
answer was given.
Results and discussion
Mean response times and errors rates were analyzed in a 2
(size: small vs. large operands) × 2 (consistency: CL vs. IL)
repeated measures ANOVA.
Errors The analysis indicated a main effect of consistency
½F 1; 24ð Þ ¼ 27:02;MSE ¼ :015; p:0001; η2p ¼ :52 ; partici-
pants made more errors on IL problems than on CL prob-
lems (.15 vs. .03, respectively). We found no significant size
effect (p > .2), possibly because only operation errors were
considered.
Response times A total of 4.1 % of the trials were excluded
as outliers deviating more than 2.5 standard deviations
from the mean or due to voice-key errors, with no
significant differences between conditions. A main effect of
s ize emerged ½F 1; 24ð Þ ¼ 90:33;MSE ¼ 133; 184; p <
:0001; η2p ¼ :79 ; word problems with small operands
(1,822 ms) were solved faster than those with large operands
(2,516 ms). This finding is consistent with previous arith-
metic research in which the size effect has been found not
only in single-digit tasks (see Ashcraft, 1992), but also in
more complex arithmetic tasks, such as word problems
(e.g., Orrantia, Rodríguez, Múñez, & Vicente, 2012). In
addition, a significant main effect of consistency was found
½F 1; 24ð Þ ¼ 63:17; MSE ¼ 101; 538; p < :0001; η2p ¼ :73 ,
in which participants solved CL problems more quickly
(1,916 ms) than IL problems (2,423 ms). This replicates the
results reported by other studies in which a similar consistency
effect was found with word problems in a standard format
(e.g., Hegarty et al., 1995; Verschaffel et al., 1992), and it




A group of 25 psychology undergraduates were recruited for
this experiment.
Materials
All participants were presented with 72 experimental arith-
metic word problems. The problems belonged to the Com-
pare 3 through 6 categories. The first sentence of each
problem held the relational term that activated the mental
representation of the situation described in the problem.
Following this sentence was the figure discrimination task.
Three types of sequences of figures were presented: non-
identical matching mental representations, non identical
mismatching mental representations, and identical mis-
matching mental representations (see Fig. 1). We used the
same figures as in Experiment 1a. After the discrimination
task, the remaining information about the problem appeared
in a line that involved the characters and the data, as in
Experiment 1b. Half of the problems were CL, and the other
half were IL.
The operands used in the word problems were similar to
those used in Experiment 1b. Forty-eight filler word prob-
lems were included, to vary the form of the problems and to
equalize the numbers of SAME and DIFFERENT responses
in the discrimination task. These filler word problems
belonged to the Combine 2 category of Riley et al.’s
(1983) classification scheme.
Procedure
On each trial (see Fig. 1), the relational sentence was pre-
sented in the middle of the screen. Pressing the space bar
caused the sentence to be erased and the discrimination task
to be presented. The figure discrimination task was presented
with the same time parameters used in Experiment 1a, and
participants indicated via keypresses whether the two
figures were the same or different. Then, the remaining
information of the problem appeared in the middle of
the screen. The participants were told to solve the word
problem correctly as quickly as possible. A microphone
that was connected to a voice-activated relay and inter-
faced with the computer registered the latencies of the
responses. After an information screen (“press the space
bar to continue”) and a blank screen (2,500 ms), the
next trial started. To familiarize participants with the
procedure, they performed four practice trials.
Design and scoring
For the discrimination task, we used a repeated measures
design with figures (nonidentical matching vs. nonidentical
mismatching vs. identical mismatching) as the only indepen-
dent variable. Two scores were determined for this task: error
rate and response time between the onset of the second rect-
angle and the moment that the participant registered an an-
swer. For the problem-solving task, the design was a 3
(figures: nonidentical matching vs. nonidentical mismatching
vs. identical mismatching) by 2 (size: small vs. large oper-
ands) by 2 (consistency: CL vs. IL) repeated measures design.
The scores for this task were the proportion of operation errors
and the response time between the answer to the discrimina-
tion task and the answer to the problem-solving task.
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Results and discussion
Discrimination task
Errors There were 2 % incorrect responses, with no signif-
icant differences between experimental conditions (F < 1).
Response times Response times deviating 2.5 standard devi-
ations from a participant’s cell means per condition (1.5 %
of trials) were discarded and did not differ between
conditions. The analysis showed a significant effect of fig-
ures ½F 2; 48ð Þ ¼ 4:84;MSE ¼ 7; 966; p < :012; η2p ¼ :16 .
Planned comparisons indicated that participants discriminat-
ed faster in the nonidentical matching condition (615 ms)
than in the nonidentical mismatching (645 ms; p < .0001)
and identical mismatching (646 ms; p < .02) conditions.
This finding supports our hypothesis that a magnitude-
based mental representation is routinely activated during
problem solving. The results suggest that the processing of
the relational sentence of the problem would activate a
magnitude-based representation of the relationship between
the terms. This mental representation would elicit priming
effects on the discrimination task. These effects could be
due to facilitation in the matching condition, interference in
the mismatching conditions, or both. However, the results
obtained in the preliminary study (Exp. 1a) support the idea
that interference effects are more likely to occur than facil-
itation effects. A combined analysis of the results of Experi-
ments 1a and 2 (with Experiment as a between-subjects
factor and Nonidentical and Identical Figures as a within-
subjects factor) showed that, when nonidentical matching
and identical mismatching conditions were considered in
Experiment 2, only the interaction effect was significant
(p < .005), due to increased response times in the identical
mismatching condition; when nonidentical mismatching and
identical mismatching conditions were considered in Exper-
iment 2, the interaction effect was not found, but response
times in the discrimination task were higher in Experiment 2
than those in Experiment 1a.
Problem-solving task
Errors The error rates are presented in Table 1. The analysis
indicated a main effect of consistency ½F 1; 24ð Þ ¼ 21:34; M
SE ¼ :011; p < :0001; η2p ¼ :47 : Participants made more
errors on IL than on CL problems (.08 vs. .02, respective-
ly). Although the main effect of figures did not reach
significance [F(2, 48) 0 3.01, MSE 0 .006, p 0 .059], there
was a significant interaction between figures and consistency
½F 2; 48ð Þ ¼ 5:32;MSE ¼ :006; p < :008; η2p ¼ :18. Planned
comparisons showed that, whereas no significant differences
were found between CL and IL problems in the nonidenti-
cal matching condition [F(1, 24) 0 2.75, p > .11], partic-
ipants made significantly more errors on IL problems than
on CL problems in the nonidentical mismatching
½F 1; 24ð Þ ¼ 28:25; p < :0001; η2p ¼ :54 and identical mis-
matching ½F 1; 24ð Þ ¼ 6:38; p < :01; η2p ¼ :21 conditions. In
addition, we found an interaction between figures and size
½F 2; 48ð Þ ¼ 5:44;MSE ¼ :006; p < :001; η2p ¼ :19 ; the ef-
fect of figures was significant for word problems with large
operands ½F 2; 23ð Þ ¼ 10:43; p < :001; η2p ¼ :48 , owing to
an advantage for the nonidentical matching as compared to the
nonidentical mismatching (p < .0001) and identical mismatch-
ing (p < .03) conditions. Word problems with small operands
did not present this effect [F(2, 23) 0 1.65, p > .20].
Response times Five percent of the trials were excluded as
outliers deviating more than 2.5 standard deviations from
the mean or due to voice-key errors, with no significant
differences between conditions. The corresponding re-
sponse time data are presented in Table 1. A main effect of
size emerged ½F 1; 24ð Þ ¼ 59:92;MSE ¼ 1; 705; 541; p <
:0001; η2p ¼ :70 ; word problems with small operands
(2,335 ms) were solved faster than those with large operands
Table 1 Mean error rate and response time (and typical error) in the problem solving task (Exp. 2)
Error Rate Response Time (ms)
Consistent Problems Inconsistent Problems Consistent Problems Inconsistent Problems
Nonidentical matching
Small operands .04 (.015) .06 (.019) 2,220 (145) 2,518 (220)
Large operands .01 (.009) .04 (.015) 3,069 (325) 3,231 (251)
Nonidentical mismatching
Small operands .01 (.009) .06 (.019) 2,047 (153) 2,517 (203)
Large operands .01 (.009) .15 (.021) 3,222 (250) 4,087 (361)
Identical mismatching
Small operands .02 (.016) .10 (.030) 1,989 (131) 2,717 (181)
Large operands .04 (.015) .08 (.022) 3,139 (232) 4,027 (405)
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(3,462 ms). In addition, participants solved CL problems
(2,614 ms) more quickly than IL problems (3,183 ms)
½F 1; 24ð Þ ¼ 34:29;MSE ¼ 706; 488; p < :0001; η2p ¼ :58 .
We found a main effect of figures ½F 2; 48ð Þ ¼ 15:33;MS
E ¼ 94; 633; p < :0001; η2p ¼ :39 . As expected, partici-
pants solved problems in the nonidentical matching con-
dition more quickly (2,759 ms) than those in the
nonidentical mismatching (2,968 ms, p < .0001) and iden-
tical mismatching (2,978 ms, p < .001) conditions. This effect
was qualified by a significant interaction between figures and
consistency ½F 2; 48ð Þ ¼ 6:18;MSE ¼ 367; 320; p < :004;
η2p ¼ :20 . Pairwise comparisons indicated that although IL
problems were solved more slowly than CL problems
(2,874 ms and 2,644 ms, respectively), the differences did
not reach significance in the nonidentical matching condition
[F(1, 24) 0 4.02, p 0 .056]. In contrast, participants solved IL
problems significantly more slowly than CL problems in
the nonidentical mismatching [3,302 ms and 2,634 ms,
respectively; F 1; 24ð Þ ¼ 19:59; p < :0001; η2p ¼ :45 and
identical mismatching [3,372 ms and 2,564 ms, respective-
ly; F 1; 24ð Þ ¼ 29:96; p < :0001; η2p ¼ :55 conditions. The
interaction between figures and size was also significant
½F 2; 48ð Þ ¼ 19:63;MSE ¼ 121; 307; p < :0001; η2p ¼ :45 .
As in the error rate analysis, the effect of figures
was significant for word problems with large operands
½F 2; 23ð Þ ¼ 21:74; p < :0001; η2p ¼ :65 , which shows that
response times were faster for nonidentical matching than for
nonidentical mismatching (p < .0001) and identical mismatch-
ing (p < .0001). This effect was not observed for word prob-
lems with small operands [F(2, 23) 0 2.47, p > 10].
These results confirm our prediction that match/mismatch
effects would be obtained for the problem-solving task. As
expected, participants were faster and less error-prone to
solve word problems in the matching condition than in the
mismatching conditions, and this effect was larger for IL
than for CL problems. In other words, the differences be-
tween IL and CL problems were smaller in the matching
than in the mismatching conditions. Remember that IL
problems are more difficult than CL problems because IL
problems increase the demands on the solvers’ working
memory, due to the extra processing required to mentally
rearrange the relational sentence. The results of the present
experiment suggest that the figures in the matching condi-
tion acted as a type of external representation that reduced
the working memory demands due to the additional
processing involved in solving IL problems. According-
ly, match/mismatch effects were also greater for word
problems with large than with small operands, since
large operands are more likely to involve arithmetic
procedures (e.g., counting, transformations, etc.; see
Campbell & Xue, 2001) that are more demanding than
direct memory retrieval.
Although the matching condition facilitated the subse-
quent problem solving by reducing working memory
demands, it is also possible that the mismatching con-
ditions interfered with problem solving. The results
obtained in Experiment 1b (with no discrimination task)
showed a 507-ms advantage for CL problems (1,916 ms)
as compared with IL problems (2,423 ms). In the present
experiment, the differences between CL and IL problems
for the nonidentical matching, nonidentical mismatching,
and identical mismatching conditions, respectively, were
230, 668, and 807 ms. A combined analysis of the
results of Experiments 1b and 2 showed that, in the
matching condition, the differences between CL and IL
were significantly reduced in Experiment 2 relative to
Experiment 1b (p < .04), whereas these differences were
increased in the mismatching conditions, but without
reaching significance (p > .30 and p 0 .07 for noniden-
tical and identical mismatching, respectively). Therefore,
the pattern of data reported for the solving task in the
present experiment suggests that facilitation effects might
be more likely than interference effects. Nevertheless, it is
necessary to consider that the overall response times were
higher in Experiment 2 (2,899 ms) than in Experiment 1b
(2,169 ms), suggesting that the figure discrimination task
itself somehow interfered with the problem-solving task.
Thus, a new control experiment was designed to eliminate





A group of 25 psychology undergraduates participated in
this experiment.
Materials and procedure
Experiment 3 was identical to Experiment 2, except that the
sequences of figures were replaced by sequences of colors.
Participants indicated whether two colors were the same or
different. To eliminate any reference to magnitude, colors
were presented on the full screen.
Results and discussion
Answers to the discrimination task were not analyzed. Mean
response times and error rates in the problem-solving task
were analyzed in a 2 (size: small sum vs. large sum) × 2
(consistency: CL vs. IL) repeated measures ANOVA.
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Errors
The analysis indicated a main effect of consistency
½F 1; 24ð Þ ¼ 10:53;MSE ¼ :017; p < :0002; η2p ¼ :30; par-
ticipants made more errors on IL than on CL problems
(.10 vs. .02, respectively).
Response times
A total of 3.2 % of the response times were excluded
as outliers or due to voice-key errors. We found a main
effect of size ½F 1; 24ð Þ ¼ 78:19;MSE ¼ 364; 926; p <
:0001; η2p ¼ :76 ; word problems with small operands
(2,506 ms) were solved more quickly than those with large
operands (3,574 ms). Furthermore, the main effect of con-
sistency was significant ½F 1; 24ð Þ ¼ 65:68;MSE ¼ 140; 878
; p < :0001; η2p ¼ :73 , showing that participants solved CL
problems (2,712 ms) more quickly than IL problems
(3,326 ms). These results are similar to those found in Exper-
iment 1b, except that the overall response times were higher in
this experiment, which confirms that including a same–differ-
ent task between the two sentences of the word problems
somehow interferes with problem solving. When compared
with the results of Experiment 2, the results of this experiment
support the assumption that facilitation effects in the matching
condition are more likely than interference effects in the mis-
matching conditions. A combined analysis of the results of
Experiments 2 and 3 indicated that the differences between
CL and IL problems were significantly reduced in Experiment
2 relative to Experiment 3 in the matching condition (p <
.005), whereas there were no significant differences be-
tween the data reported in the mismatching conditions
in Experiments 2 and 3 (ps > .30).
General discussion
The present study was conducted to investigate whether,
during arithmetic word-problem solving, solvers construct a
magnitude-based mental representation that goes beyond a
conceptual representation in the form of propositions. Partic-
ipants solved word problems and performed a figure discrim-
ination task. After reading a sentence that described the
comparison between the quantities of two protagonists’
objects, participants were slower to discriminate as different
two figures if the relationship between them, in terms of
magnitude, mismatched the relationship between the quanti-
ties implied in the sentence. These findings support the hy-
pothesis that solvers construct a mental representation that
represents the situation described in the text of the problem
(Thevenot, 2010). However, the present study advances be-
yond the previous findings by demonstrating that solvers
construct a magnitude-based mental simulation and that this
occurs during online problem comprehension, possibly via an
automatic activation process. It could be argued that the
activation of this mental representation occurs under some
level of strategic control, since each sentence describing a
comparison between quantities was followed by a discrimina-
tion task. Thus, participants could have anticipated the se-
quence of figures during relational sentence reading.
Nevertheless, this explanation is unlikely, since the use of a
same–different task ensured that the figure discrimination was
irrelevant for the problem-solving task. In fact, participants
reported that there was no relation between the two tasks.2
These results fit nicely with those studies that have sug-
gested that the representation of numerical magnitude may
rely on a format also shared by other, nonnumerical magni-
tude dimensions (Cohen Kadosh et al., 2008; Walsh, 2003).
According to this argument, individuals possess one, unified
magnitude representation system serving diverse quantifi-
able dimensions. Following this notion of a shared magni-
tude code, the results from the discrimination task in the
present study could be interpreted in terms of “within-mag-
nitude priming” (Walsh, 2003, p. 487)—that is, a cross-
domain compatibility effect between the numerical task
(i.e., the numerical dimension) and the discrimination task
(i.e., a nonnumerical dimension) due to the magnitude code
shared by the two tasks. Thus, since participants responded
more slowly in the mismatching than in the matching con-
dition, the processing of the relational sentence of the prob-
lem activated a magnitude-based representation that
interfered with the discrimination task.
It could be argued that participants did not construct a
real magnitude representation, since the figures in the dis-
crimination task only depicted the relationship between the
variables contained in the relational sentence (e.g., John >
Peter), but not their relative magnitudes (i.e., the ratio of the
sizes of the rectangles as a function of the numbers pre-
sented in the word problem).3 This is a reasonable concern,
because the numerical distance effect (i.e., participants take
more time when comparing digits representing closer rather
than more distant quantities) indicates that numerical mag-
nitude is processed in a “refined” way (Tzelgov, Meyer, &
Henik, 1992), which would support a relative magnitude
representation. However, the numerical magnitude may also
be processed in a “crude” manner, such as small–large (e.g.,
in the numerical Stroop task; see Cohen Kadosh, 2008;
Tzelgov et al., 1992). In this context, we assume that crude
processing is dominant during the construction phase of the
mental representation of the problem, because the next stage
involves developing a plan for solving the problem (i.e.,
2 Nevertheless, following a procedure proposed by Stanfield and
Zwaan (2001), a post-hoc analysis showed similar match/mismatch
effects in the first and second halves of the experiment.
3 The authors thank an anonymous reviewer who suggested this issue.
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selecting a solution procedure; see Mayer, 1985), which
requires only a representation depicting the relationship
between the elements of the situation described in the prob-
lem. Whether more refined processing of numerical magni-
tude emerges later is an open question that will need further
research.
Given that we assume that the mental representation
preserves only the relationship between the elements of the
situation described in the text, but not its exact wording, the
relationships John > Peter and Peter < John would both
account for the mental representation created by the problem
in Fig. 1. Hence, it could be argued that the nonidentical
mismatching condition (SMALL–LARGE) would also
match the mental representation activated from the relational
sentence, since the first rectangle (SMALL) might be
mapped onto the second person named in the word
problem. Considering the example in Fig. 1, both matching
(LARGE–SMALL: John > Peter) and mismatching
(SMALL–LARGE: Peter < John) conditions would then
reflect the situation described in the problem. In fact, The-
venot (2010) provided evidence for this possibility. Her
results suggest that our nonidentical matching and noniden-
tical mismatching conditions might depict the situation de-
scribed in the relational sentence, since only the relationship
between the elements is preserved. Nevertheless, whereas
Thevenot’s study focused on relatively long-term represen-
tations, with participants performing recognition tasks, the
present study has focused on mental representations activat-
ed during online processing of the problem. In this sense,
our results support an (immediate) representation that pre-
serves the order of variables as they are presented in the
word problem (i.e., the first rectangle is mapped onto the
first person named in the word problem, and the second
rectangle is mapped onto the second person named in the
problem).4 This is consistent with the proposal of Jahn,
Knauff, and Johnson-Laird (2007) that individuals construct
mental models from an assertion (e.g., “The lamp is next to
the magazine”) working from left to right, so that the objects
are ordered from left to right in the order in which they are
referred to in the assertion (i.e., LAMP–MAGAZINE
instead of MAGAZINE–LAMP).
Our study also adds to previous findings by demon-
strating that supporting the construction of a mental
representation during processing of the word problem
helps solvers carry out the solution process. Participants
were faster and less error-prone in the solving task when
figures matched than when they mismatched the mental
representation constructed from the relational sentence. In
addition, these matching–mismatching effects were larger
for IL than for CL problems. This result would be
explained by the fact that, since solvers are guided by
the goal of solving an arithmetic problem, they need to
keep a representation of the relationship between the two
variables included in the relational sentence active in
working memory. Thus, when the remaining information
of the problem is read, the solver must tie the known
and unknown quantities to the variables represented and
plan his or her solution on such a representation. In this
way, a mental representation of magnitude would aid in
this process, allowing the solver to quickly tie the infor-
mation being processed to the information held in work-
ing memory. Since IL problems require more processing
for solvers (see above), an external representation depicting
the relation stated in the relational sentence, in terms of
magnitude, would reduce the demands on working memory
during problem solving. This finding suggests useful educa-
tional implications, since it gives us clues about how to
improve the format in which word problems are presented,
especially considering that word problems are often accom-
panied by illustrations that have little or nothing to do with
problem solving. Presenting the problems accompanied by
external representations reflecting the situation described in
terms of magnitudes might help children to integrate the
information into a coherent mental representation (Múñez,
Orrantia, & Rosales, in press; Orrantia, Tarín, & Vicente,
2011; Vicente, Orrantia, & Verschaffel, 2008).
In sum, the results of the present study with both a
discrimination and a problem-solving task provide con-
verging evidence for the assumption that, during problem
solving, solvers construct a mental representation whose
structure is analogous to the relational structure of the
situation described in the problem. In addition, we as-
sume that its nature is based on magnitudes; that is,
solvers mentally represent (or simulate) in terms of mag-
nitudes the relationship between the quantities described
in the situation that is represented. These findings add to
a growing body of literature that emphasize the experi-
ential view of language comprehension, according to
which comprehension entails establishing an analog rela-
tionship between the text and the reader’s perceptual
experiences. There is converging evidence that perceptual
information such as shape, orientation, or color is acti-
vated while people process words, sentences, or texts
(see Zwaan, 2004). This activation reflects a mental
simulation associated with experiential traces of the ref-
erential situation that an individual has encountered in
the past. The present study shows that perceptual infor-
mation, in this case based on magnitudes, is routinely
activated when word problems are processed, since mag-
nitude is a characteristic dimension of information that a
word problem refers to.
4 In fact, a closer look at Thevenot’s (2010) data reveals that the
direction of the relationship mentioned in the wording (i.e., our match-
ing condition) was more often recognized as the resulting mental
model created from the problem.
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